Source memory may comprise recollection of multiple features of the encoding episode. To analyze the simultaneous representation and retrieval of those multiple features, a multinomial memory model is presented that measures memory for crossed dimensions of source information. The first experiment investigated the validity of the new model. The model showed an excellent statistical fit to empirical data, and the parameters of multidimensional source memory were sensitive to manipulations of source similarity on distinct dimensions. The second experiment used the model to test the hypothesis that source memory for individual context attributes is stochastically related in the case of conscious recollection but independent in the case of familiarity-based recognition judgments.
Source memory means memory for contextual information that was acquired during the encoding episode of a given item or fact and that indicates the origin of the item or fact knowledge. Source memory, or source monitoring, includes recollection of the spatiotemporal circumstances and physical features of stimulus presentation as well as memory for the cognitive operations and emotional states during stimulus perception (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993) . A special case of source memory, reality monitoring, refers to the distinction of items or events that were actually perceived from those that were internally generated by thought or imagination (Johnson & Raye, 1981) .
Over the recent years, source memory has gained increasing attention in various domains of psychological research, such as child development (e.g., Lindsay, Johnson, & Kwon, 1991) , cognitive aging (e.g., Ferguson, Hashtroudi, & Johnson, 1992; Johnson, De Leonardis, Hashtroudi, & Ferguson, 1995; Schacter, Osowiecki, Kaszniak, Kihlstrom, & Valdiserri, 1994) , clinical psychology and neuropsychology (e.g., Multhaup & Balota, 1997; Shimamura & Squire, 1987) , and eyewitness testimony (e.g., Lindsay & Johnson, 1989; Zaragoza & Lane, 1994) . Moreover, it has been shown that biases in source attributions can reflect cognitive schemas or social stereotypes (Bayen, Nakamura, Dupuis, & Yang, 2000; Klauer & Meiser, 2000; Mather, Johnson, & De Leonardis, 1999) and account for phenomena of cryptomnesia (i.e., unintended plagiarism; e.g., Macrae, Bodenhausen, & Calvini, 1999; Marsh & Bower, 1993) .
Finally, the prominent distinction between familiarity-based processes and conscious recollection in recognition memory as operationalized by the process dissociation procedure (Jacoby, 1991) is based on the ability to recollect a particular aspect of source information defined as criterial by the task at hand (see Buchner, Erdfelder, Steffens, & Martensen, 1997; Gruppuso, Lindsay, & Kelley, 1997; Mulligan & Hirshman, 1997) .
All of the different studies of source memory rely on the fundamental assumption that memory for source information can be distinguished from memory for the items or facts themselves. This assumption has gained empirical support from differential effects on memory for source versus memory for item information exerted by quasi-experimental variables such as age (see Spencer & Raz, 1995 , for a review), dementia (Multhaup & Balota, 1997) , amnesia (Shimamura & Squire, 1987) , and frontal lobe dysfunction (Glisky, Polster, & Routhieaux, 1995) . Furthermore, investigations of the time course of item recognition and the use of contextual information in memory judgments (Dosher, 1984; Gronlund & Ratcliff, 1989; Johnson, Kounios, & Reeder, 1994; McElree, Dolan, & Jacoby, 1999) and analyses of event-related potentials in recognition tasks (Allan, Wilding, & Rugg, 1998; Wilding & Rugg, 1996) have substantiated the notion of separate memory procedures underlying item recognition and source retrieval. Finally, and perhaps most conclusively, the distinction between memory for items or facts and memory for contextual information has been warranted by experimental dissociations of item memory and source memory (Bayen, Murnane, & Erdfelder, 1996; Jurica & Shimamura, 1999; .
Given the comprehensive evidence of a functional distinction between source memory and item memory, the concept of source memory can be considered in additional detail. In the theoretical source memory framework proposed by Johnson et al. (1993) and adopted by most researchers in the domain, memory for source information is essentially regarded as multidimensional; that is, multiple features of the encoding episode can be retained in memory and contribute to later source attributions. In fact, episodic context information for any event is intrinsically multidi-mensional, capturing temporal and spatial information as well as various perceptual features of the event's occurrence. Despite the notion that source memory comprises memory for multiple context attributes, however, source memory tests are generally limited to the assessment of memory for only one aspect of the encoding episode, such as memory for the speaker of a word or phrase, for the time of occurrence, or for the perception versus mental generation of a given item. Although recollection of multiple contextual features may be involved in these unidimensional source discrimination tasks, the tasks do not allow for unraveling the differential impact of memory for various aspects of the encoding episode.
A few studies have explicitly considered memory for more than one dimension of source information. In most of these studies, a subsidiary dimension was superimposed onto a criterion dimension to enhance source memory for the latter. For example, source discrimination between a male and a female speaker was improved by superimposing a spatial distinction during encoding, such that the male speaker was consistently located at one spatial location and the female speaker at a different location (Ferguson et al., 1992; Geiselman & Crawley, 1983) . Alternatively, children's source memory for spatial location was shown to benefit from presenting stimuli in a male voice at one location and in a female voice at the other, as compared with using the same voice at both locations . Analogously, a temporal distinction and a distinction between different orienting tasks (Johnson et al., 1995; Rugg, Schloerscheidt, & Mark, 1998) were superimposed on the criterion dimension of speaker, and a distinction between varying orienting tasks was superimposed on a spatial criterion dimension . The results of these experimental manipulations show that superimposed source information often enhances correct source attributions, suggesting the use of multiple context cues in source judgments. However, superimposing one source dimension onto another results in redundant rather than truly multidimensional source information and therefore does not address the issue of monitoring multidimensional episodic context information in general.
Studies in which different dimensions of source information are crossed, rather than superimposed, are better suited to shed light on the processes of multidimensional source memory. Investigation of memory for crossed source information allows one to simultaneously measure recollection performance for distinct features of the encoding episode. In particular, studies involving crossed context dimensions may provide evidence concerning the question of how multidimensional source information is represented in episodic memory, such as in terms of independently stored pieces of contextual information, in terms of dependent (e.g., mutually cuing) episodic features, or in terms of an all-ornone principle according to which either all source attributes are retrieved conjointly or none are retrieved at all.
However, most of the studies with crossed dimensions of source information during the learning phase still assessed source memory for only one of the dimensions in the later test phase, which limits their power to provide insight into the representation and retrieval of multidimensional source information. In a reality monitoring experiment conducted by Johnson, Raye, Foley, and Kim (1982) , for instance, the distinction between perceived and imagined pictorial stimuli was crossed with the distinction between stimulus location on the left-hand side and right-hand side of a screen. In the memory test, however, only decisions referring to the location were required. Similarly, Chalfonte and Johnson (1996) provided multidimensional context information on object drawings in terms of both varying colors and locations within a spatial array, but they tested memory for color and memory for location in separate experimental conditions. In a memory experiment within the process dissociation paradigm, Yonelinas and Jacoby (1996) presented words at two locations and in two font sizes, with the source dimensions of location and font completely crossed. At test, however, only one of these dimensions formed the criterion for memory judgments. Lastly, Klauer and Meiser (2000) presented participants with behavioral statements about male and female target individuals belonging to one of two fictitious groups. Gender and group membership were orthogonally crossed in the stimulus set, but, after presentation, participants made source attributions only with respect to group membership.
Hence, the studies of Johnson et al. (1982) , Chalfonte and Johnson (1996) , Yonelinas and Jacoby (1996) , and Klauer and Meiser (2000) employed nonredundant multidimensional source information, thereby setting the stage for investigation of complex source monitoring processes. However, insofar as the memory tests were limited to one source dimension at a time, these studies did not address the memory processes involved in the concurrent retrieval of context information concerning different facets of the encoding episode. To the best of our knowledge, there are only two published studies to date in which simultaneous recollection of several dimensions of source information was investigated.
First, in a study conducted by Light and Berger (1976) , words were presented in uppercase versus lowercase letters and in two different colors with varying instructions for the learning phase. In a subsequent recognition test, the original combination of case and color had to be identified for words that were judged "old," corresponding to a source memory test for crossed source information. The results indicated that the instruction to retain either case or color together with the target words increased correct recall of this particular feature and left recall of the other feature unaffected, suggesting independent storage of the visual attributes. Second, in a study on age-related impairments in source memory, Schacter et al. (1994) used 32 pictures of faces as sources of fact statements. The 32 pictures had been generated by crossing five binary dimensions of face characteristics such as gender (male vs. female) and glasses (present vs. absent). At test, participants were asked to recall for each fact the source's features on each of the five dimensions, thereby requiring source judgments on multiple context attributes. The results showed age-related deficits of memory for combinations of source attributes, in line with findings related to unidimensional source memory.
Taken together, the ubiquity of multidimensional context information, the theoretical source memory framework, and the use of superimposed and crossed dimensions of source information in current experimental research highlight the significance of memory for multiple aspects of the encoding context. At the same time, they emphasize the necessity of improving our understanding of the cognitive processes underlying the simultaneous monitoring of multidimensional source information. With this goal in mind, a memory model for crossed dimensions of source information is proposed in the present article. The model specifies processes of item recognition, of source memory for different dimensions of context information, and of guessing on various stages of a source monitoring task for crossed source information. The model is formulated within the family of multinomial processing tree models (Batchelder & Riefer, 1999; Riefer & Batchelder, 1988) . Multinomial models disentangle the cognitive processes that are jointly involved in task performance, and they allow one to estimate parameters of memory and guessing and to test psychological hypotheses through straightforward model comparisons.
In the next section, the multinomial memory model for crossed source information is derived from unidimensional source memory models, and sufficient conditions for global identifiability of the new model are discussed. In the remainder of the article, two experiments are presented. The first experiment tested the validity of the new model. In the second experiment, the model was used to test a novel hypothesis on the representation and retrieval of multidimensional source information, thus addressing the issue of cognitive binding in episodic memory.
Multinomial Source Memory Models
Multinomial processing tree models form a family of parameterized multinomial or product multinomial distribution models that specify psychological assumptions about the cognitive processes underlying observable responses. Formally, the probability distribution of N responses over K mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive response categories is parameterized in terms of a vector of S parameters ϭ ( 1 , . . . , S ), with 0 Ͻ s Ͻ 1 for s ϭ 1, . . . , S, yielding the probability vector p() ϭ [p 1 (), . . . , p K ()]. The model parameters 1 to S represent probabilities of discrete cognitive events. Combinations or successions of cognitive events that jointly render a behavioral response are modeled by branches specifying products of parameters. Thus, psychological assumptions about cognitive processes are mapped onto a stochastic model by defining the parameter space and by linking the parameters to processing branches that terminate in observable response categories. The theory of multinomial models, including maximum-likelihood parameter estimation, overall model testing, and tests of specific hypotheses within a model, has been delineated by Hu and Batchelder (1994) and Batchelder (1988, 1991) . Batchelder and Riefer (1999) provided a review of model applications in various areas of cognitive psychology.
Multinomial Memory Models for Unidimensional Source Information
Several multinomial models have been proposed for the analysis of frequency data from source monitoring experiments. Batchelder and Riefer (1990) and presented models for the standard source recognition task with two source categories. In this task, participants have to distinguish between target items from an earlier learning phase and new distractor items, and they have to discriminate between two different sources of target items. The parameter vectors of these models contain parameters for item memory in old-new recognition, parameters for source recollection with respect to the two sources of target items, and parameters for guessing processes in old-new decisions and source assignments. Batchelder, Hu, and Riefer (1994) and Riefer, Hu, and Batchelder (1994) extended the use of multinomial source memory models to the discrimination of more than two sources.
Following this extension, Figure 1 depicts the processing tree representation of a multinomial source memory model for four source categories, labeled A, B, C, and D. As illustrated by the upper tree, target items from source i, i ʦ {A, B, C, D}, are recognized as old with probability D i . Provided recognition, the actual source of target items from source i is recollected with probability d i , yielding the correct source assignment. If source recollection fails, with probability 1 Ϫ d i , one of the response categories A to D is selected by guessing. The parameters a A to a D denote the guessing proportions for each of the four source categories given correct recognition of target items, with the constraint ¥ i a i ϭ 1. If item recognition fails, with probability 1 Ϫ D i , target items can nevertheless be considered old on the basis of a guessing process, which is reflected by the parameter b. Because it is impossible to recollect the source of these unrecognized items, they are assigned to one of the four sources according to the guessing proportions g A to g D , with ¥ i g i ϭ 1. Target items that are neither recognized nor considered old by guessing are rejected as new. The lower tree in Figure 1 illustrates the cognitive processes underlying responses to distractor items, that is, items not presented in the learning phase. Distractors are identified as new with probability D N , which results in a correct rejection. If identification fails, with probability 1 Ϫ D N , distractors are either considered old with probability b and assigned to one of the sources A to D with guessing probabilities g A to g D or rejected as new with probability 1 Ϫ b.
Because target items can be classified as old on the grounds of both a genuine recognition process and guessing, whereas distractors are classified as old only by guessing, the model presented in Figure 1 is based on a high threshold assumption of item recognition (see Green & Swets, 1966, chap. 5; Krantz, 1969; Luce, 1963) . Accordingly, D i is the high threshold parameter of item recognition for target items from source i. Deviating from the model formulation of Riefer et al. (1994) , the model in Figure 1 also contains a high threshold parameter D N for new items. This parameter reflects the identification of distractors, but not target items, as new (cf. Batchelder et al., 1994, p. 64) . The specification of high threshold parameters for both the recognition of target items and the identification of distractors results in a two-high threshold or double-high threshold model of item recognition (Macmillan & Creelman, 1990 , 1991 Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988) . Two-high threshold models of item recognition define three cognitive states: one state of actual recognition of target items as old, one state of actual identification of distractors as new, and one state of uncertainty that applies to targets and distractors alike and gives rise to a guessing process. Two-high threshold models have advantages over one-high threshold models in different respects. First, two-high threshold models have been found to be empirically and theoretically superior to one-high threshold models in describing data from recognition experiments Erdfelder & Buchner, 1998; Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988) . Second, investigations of memory decisions for old and new items support the notions that correct rejections of new items do not simply result from an absence of their recognition as old (Kolers & Palef, 1976) and that specific cognitive processes are involved in the identification of distractor items as new. These processes include metamnestic inferences that the failure to recollect an item is diagnostic of its previous nonoccurrence (Förster & Strack, 1998; Strack & Bless, 1994) . In the two-high threshold model, the cognitive processes of distractor identification are captured by the parameter D N . Therefore, throughout this article, discussion is confined to models that contain the two-high threshold assumption of item recognition. The source memory model for more than two sources based on the one-high threshold assumption can be derived from the model presented in Figure 1 by the parameter fixation
Recently, Dodson, Holland, and Shimamura (1998) and Klauer and Wegener (1998) presented modifications of the multinomial source memory model for several sources to measure partial source recollection. In these modified models, various elementary sources, such as individual speakers, are nested within two superordinate source categories, such as those relating to gender or professional status. Accordingly, the models contain source memory parameters for the elementary source instances as well as for the superordinate source categories, allowing for recollection of the superordinate source information in the absence of more specific source memory. Differing from the models presented by Dodson et al. (1998) and Klauer and Wegener (1998) , the new multinomial memory model described in the next section is based on the concept of crossed, rather than hierarchically nested, dimensions of source information. Whereas the models for nested source information allow measuring memory for the specific source instances and partial source memory in terms of the superordinate category, the model for crossed source information allows Figure 1 . Processing tree representation of the multinomial memory model for four source categories. i denotes items from source i, i ʦ {A, B, C, D}; New denotes distractor items. D i ϭ probability of recognizing target items from source i as old; D N ϭ probability of identifying distractor items as new; d i ϭ probability of recollecting source i for recognized target items; a A , a B , a C , a D ϭ proportions of guessing Sources A, B, C, and D for recognized target items; b ϭ probability of guessing that an item is old; g A , g B , g C , g D ϭ proportions of guessing Sources A, B, C, and D for unrecognized target items and unidentified distractors. measuring source memory for separate dimensions of context information.
A Multinomial Memory Model for Crossed Dimensions of Source Information
As just outlined, the theoretical source memory framework as well as several recent applications of source memory tests in experimental research are based on the notion that source monitoring involves multiple dimensions of context information from the encoding episode. This notion forms the starting point of our formulation of a new model in which memory for two context dimensions is considered simultaneously. Table 1 displays the structure of the frequency data that arise from a source memory experiment with crossed binary source dimensions, one dimension pertaining to the discrimination between Source A and Source B and the other pertaining to the discrimination between Source X and Source Y. Applied to the design of the reality monitoring experiment of Johnson et al. (1982) , for instance, the dimension of Source A versus B denotes the distinction between perceived and imagined stimuli, and the dimension of Source X versus Y reflects the different locations of perceived and imagined stimuli.
As shown in Table 1 , the source memory task for crossed binary source dimensions permits responses in five mutually exclusive response categories to items from each of the four source combinations (A, X), (A, Y), (B, X), and (B, Y), as well as to new distractor items. f ij͉ij is the frequency of correct assignments of items from source combination (i, j) to source i on the first dimension and to source j on the second dimension, i ʦ {A, B} and j ʦ {X, Y}. For k i and l j, f il͉ij and f kj͉ij represent the frequencies of correct source assignments on only one dimension, and f kl͉ij denotes the frequency of incorrect assignments on both dimensions. f New͉ij in the right-most column of Table 1 signifies the frequency of misses of target items from source combination (i, j) . Turning to the responses to new distractor items, f kl͉New refers to the frequency of false alarms with assignment to source k on the first dimension and source l on the second dimension. Finally, f New͉New indicates the number of correct rejections of new items.
The processing tree representation of the multinomial memory model for crossed source dimensions-that is, for the data structure shown in Table 1 -is depicted in Figure 2 . Analogous to the previous notation, D ij denotes the high threshold parameter of item recognition for target items from source combination (i, j), and D N denotes the high threshold parameter of distractor identification. Provided that target items from source combination (i, j) are recognized as old, the source information referring to the first dimension is recollected with probability d ij 1 , resulting in correct assignments to source i (see upper tree of Figure 2 ). If source recollection fails on the first dimension, with probability 1 Ϫ d ij 1 , Source A is selected with guessing probability a 1 , and Source B is selected with the complementary guessing probability 1 Ϫ a 1 . If the source category of the first dimension is recollected, the source pertaining to the second dimension is recollected with probability d ij 2 . If, on the other hand, the source category of the first dimension is not recollected, the source on the second dimension can nevertheless be recollected with probability e ij 2 . Recollection of the source on the second dimension results in correct assignments to source j. If source recollection fails on the second dimension, with probability 1 Ϫ d ij 2 or 1 Ϫ e ij 2 , respectively, either Source X or Source Y is selected on the basis of a guessing process that may be influenced by the source assignment on the first dimension. Therefore, the model contains two conditional guessing proportions for Source X, one given assignment to Source A on the first dimension, a ͉A 2 , and one given assignment to Source B on the first dimension, a ͉B 2 . Source Y is selected with complementary probabilities 1 Ϫ a ͉A 2 and 1 Ϫ a ͉B 2 , respectively. If target items are not recognized, with probability 1 Ϫ D ij , they are considered old with guessing probability b. In this case, items are assigned with guessing probability g 1 to Source A and with guessing probability 1 Ϫ g 1 to Source B on the first source dimension. Again, the guessing proportions for source assignments on the second dimension are specified conditional on source assignments on the first dimension, with g ͉A 2 denoting the guessing proportion of Source X given assignment to Source A and g ͉B 2 denoting the guessing proportion of Source X given assignment to Source B. Accordingly, Source Y is chosen with probabilities 1 Ϫ g ͉A 2 and 1 Ϫ g ͉B 2 , respectively. As shown in the lower tree of Figure 2 , responses to distractors that are not identified as new, with probability 1 Ϫ D N , are guided by the same guessing processes as in the case of unrecognized target items.
The model presented in Figure 2 contains several psychological assumptions concerning the processes of multidimensional source memory. First, the probability of source recollection on the second dimension may be affected by the recollection of source information on the first dimension, as specified by the different parameters d ij 2 and e ij 2 . Thus, the model allows for stochastic dependence of source memory for the two dimensions. The possibility of stochastically dependent memory for different kinds of source information reflects the hypothesis that recollection of episodic context information on one dimension can facilitate or cue retrieval of information on a different dimension, as one would predict from the principle of encoding specificity (Tulving, 1983; Tulving & Thomson, 1973) . Second, complete source recollection of the combination (i, j) is modeled as the intersection of recollecting the individual sources i and j (i.e., product of d ij 1 and d ij 2 ) rather than as memory for the combination itself. That is, although recollection of source information pertaining to the two dimensions may be stochastically related, no process is specified that reflects memory for the conjunction of source information. Figure 2 . Processing tree representation of the multinomial memory model for crossed source information.
(i, j) denotes items from source i of the first dimension and source j of the second dimension, i ʦ {A, B} and j ʦ {X, Y}; New denotes distractor items. D ij ϭ probability of recognizing target items from source combination (i, j) as old; D N ϭ probability of identifying distractor items as new; d ij 1 ϭ probability of recollecting source i of the first dimension for recognized target items from source combination (i, j); d ij 2 ϭ probability of recollecting source j of the second dimension for recognized target items from source combination (i, j) given recollection of source i of the first dimension; e ij 2 ϭ probability of recollecting source j of the second dimension for recognized target items from source combination (i, j) given no recollection of source i of the first dimension; a 1 ϭ proportion of guessing Source A for recognized target items; a ͉A 2 ϭ proportion of guessing Source X for recognized target items given assignment to Source A; a ͉B 2 ϭ proportion of guessing Source X for recognized target items given assignment to Source B; b ϭ probability of guessing that an item is old; g 1 ϭ proportion of guessing Source A for unrecognized target items and unidentified distractors; g ͉A 2 ϭ proportion of guessing Source X for unrecognized target items and unidentified distractors given assignment to Source A; g ͉B 2 ϭ proportion of guessing Source X for unrecognized target items and unidentified distractors given assignment to Source B.
Third, the guessing parameters referring to the second dimension are specified conditional on the outcome of the assignment process on the first dimension. There is empirical evidence that guessing proportions in source assignments can reflect perceived or expected correlations between item contents and source categories (Bayen et al., 2000; Klauer & Meiser, 2000; Klauer & Wegener, 1998) and that they may mirror the function of metacognitive strategies aiming at minimizing assignment errors Hoffman, 1997) . Because these guessing processes can differentially affect assignments to the four source combinations, the guessing distributions are saturated in the model, which is accomplished by specifying three a and three g parameters for the four source combinations. Moreover, metacognitive strategies may result in different guessing proportions for recognized target items as opposed to nonrecognized target items or unidentified distractors , which justifies the distinction between the a and g parameters (see also .
The general model shown in Figure 2 allows the specification of submodels that reflect alternative assumptions about the representation and retrieval of multidimensional source information. In particular, the model of stochastically independent source recollection and the model of an all-or-none principle of source memory are special cases of the general model. Stochastic independence of memory for two source dimensions can be specified by the parameter restriction d ij 2 ϭ e ij 2 for all source combinations (i, j). The restriction mirrors the assumption that recollection of source information on one dimension has no effect, neither facilitating nor inhibiting, on the retrieval of source information on the other dimension. An all-or-none principle of source memory is reflected by the parameter fixations d ij 2 ϭ 1 and e ij 2 ϭ 0 for all source combinations (i, j). The corresponding submodel represents the assumption that source memory refers not to the individual context dimensions but to their combination, so source information is recollected either jointly on both dimensions or on neither dimension. Mathematically, this submodel is equivalent to the unidimensional source monitoring model for four source categories ( Figure  1 ) if each of the four categories represents a different combination of sources i and j.
The models of stochastic independence and of an all-or-none principle of source memory represent the extremes on a continuum of gradual dependence among memories for different aspects of the encoding episode. Because these models can be specified and tested within the framework of the general source monitoring model for crossed source information, competing assumptions about the representation and retrieval of multidimensional source information can be compared.
Model Equations and Identifiability
The processing tree model in Figure 2 specifies the probability of an observation in each cell of Table 1 as a function of the model parameters.
the probability of assigning a target item of source combination (i, j) to source k on the first dimension and to source l on the second dimension, i, k ʦ {A, B} and j, l ʦ {X, Y}, can be written as
for k i, l ϭ j;
The probability of missing a target item from source combination
Distractors elicit false alarms and are assigned to sources k and l with probability
and they are correctly rejected as new with probability
If the multinomial memory model for crossed source information is to be used as a measurement tool for item recognition and two-dimensional source recollection, one has to ascertain that the model is identifiable or provide psychologically plausible parameter restrictions that yield identifiable submodels. A model is globally identifiable if and only if any probability vector p is produced by one parameter vector at the most, that is, if p() ϭ p(*) implies ϭ * for all vectors and * in the parameter space. A necessary condition for model identifiability is that the number of parameters does not exceed the number of unrestricted probabilities, or frequencies, in the data matrix. Because the marginal row frequencies in Table 1 are considered fixed by the experimental design, the table contains 20 unrestricted frequency counts. With the full parameter vector
, the model for crossed source information has 24 parameters and thus violates the necessary condition for identifiability. Therefore, the parameter space has to be reduced by appropriate restrictions to construct identifiable submodels.
To begin with, we simplify the model by assuming that the probability of distractor identification equals the probability of target item recognition, that is, D N ϭ D ij for one or more source combinations (i, j) . This assumption has been suggested as a standard restriction in two-high threshold models (Macmillan & Creelman, 1990 , 1991 , and it has been shown to be empirically tenable Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988) . Albeit not a necessary condition to achieve identifiability in the multinomial memory model of crossed source information, the restriction D N ϭ D ij guarantees that the recognition and guessing parameters of the old-new judgment can be estimated with reasonable precision even in situations in which the standard deviations of parameter estimates are unacceptably large in the unrestricted case (see also Batchelder et al., 1994, p. 64) . The latter occurs, for example, if the guessing proportions of source assignments are equal for recognized and unrecognized items and the source discrimination parameters converge to zero. Because the model contains four high threshold parameters of item recognition, one for each source combination, it may be difficult to determine which of these parameters should be equated with D N . If the item recognition parameters differ substantially, a conceptual decision is necessary for the specification of D N (see . Otherwise, the problem can easily be solved by constraining all of the high threshold parameters to be equal, that is, by the restriction
As can immediately be derived from Equation 2, equality of the four item recognition parameters D ij holds if and only if the proportion of misses does not vary as a function of source combination, that is, if p New͉AX ϭ p New͉AY ϭ p New͉BX ϭ p New͉BY . This equality hypothesis can be examined through a test of stochastic independence between "new" versus "old" responses (collapsed across source assignments) and source combinations of target items. We therefore recommend that researchers first test for the equality of item recognition parameters D ij and then specify restrictions including D N on the basis of this preliminary analysis (see also Batchelder & Riefer, 1990, p. 554) . If D N is constrained to be equal to at least one item recognition parameter, the remaining model parameters describing the old-new decision, that is, the memory parameters D and the guessing parameter b, as well as the guessing parameters for source assignments of unrecognized items, g 1 , g ͉A 2 , and g ͉B 2 , are identifiable irrespective of the further model specifications (see Appendix).
Next, we consider the parameters that characterize source assignments of recognized target items, that is, the parameters d ij 1 and a 1 for the first source dimension and the parameters d ij 2 , e ij 2 , a ͉A 2 , and a ͉B 2 for the second dimension. Figure 3 displays several sets of restrictions for the parameters of each source dimension that render globally identifiable submodels. Arrows between different sets of restrictions indicate hierarchical relations among the resulting submodels, that is, relations in which one model entails the other model as a special case. In many applications, it may be psychologically plausible to assume that the probability of source recollection on a given dimension is independent of an item's actual source category on this dimension and also independent of the item's source category on the other dimension. This assumption can be integrated in the model by Restrictions (1b) and (2b) in Figure 3 . Alternatively, it can be held that the guessing proportions in source assignments are independent of the memory state of an item, which is reflected by Restrictions (1c) and (2c). This assumption can be violated, however, if the task gives rise to differential expectations concerning the origin of recognized and unrecognized items Riefer et al., 1994) . Finally, restrictions on the source recollection and guessing parameters can be combined, as in Restrictions (1d) and (2d). Provided that the parameters D and b are identifiable, imposing one of the restrictions (1a) to (1d) on the parameters of the first source dimension and one of the restrictions (2a) to (2d) on the parameters of the second source dimension is sufficient to accomplish global identifiability of the multinomial memory model for crossed source information (see Appendix).
Overview of the Experiments
In the following, we describe two experiments in which the multinomial memory model for crossed source information was applied. In the first experiment, we tested the suitability of the model to describe empirical data and to reflect experimental manipulations of source memory for two context dimensions. In the second experiment, we focused on the representation of multidimensional source information and on the moderating role of different states of recognition memory for the stochastic relation between source recollections of various contextual aspects. Thus, whereas the first experiment concerned the issue of model validity, the second experiment addressed a substantial research question through use of the new model.
A multinomial model must satisfy two criteria to be considered a valid model of cognitive processing and, as a consequence, a valid measurement tool for the processes involved. First, the model must be empirically valid in the sense that it fits empirical data. Empirical validity of a new model is tested by means of an overall goodness-of-fit test in which the model proves valid if it does not have to be rejected as a result of significant misfit. The overall goodness of fit of a multinomial model is assessed by the likelihood ratio test statistic G 2 , which is asymptotically chi-square distributed with the number of degrees of freedom amounting to the difference between the number of independent cell probabilities and the number of model parameters Riefer & Batchelder, 1988 , 1991 . Second, the model must be psychologically valid in the sense that the model parameters reflect the cognitive processes that they are specified to represent. Psychological validity, or construct validity, can be evaluated by testing whether the parameters are selectively sensitive to experimental manipulations affecting individual cognitive processes (e.g., Buchner, Erdfelder, & VaterrodtPlünnecke, 1995; Klauer & Wegener, 1998) . To test for specific effects on model parameters, conditional likelihood ratio tests ⌬G 2 can be used to compare hierarchically related models Riefer & Batchelder, 1988 , 1991 .
Because the multinomial memory model for crossed source information is a novel extension of source monitoring models for single binary context dimensions, its empirical and psychological validity was evaluated in the first experiment. In particular, the model was applied to a source monitoring task for two context dimensions, and the discriminability of the two dimensions was orthogonally manipulated. The design of Experiment 1 allowed us to test the empirical validity of the model within each of four experimental conditions and to test its psychological validity in terms of parameter changes according to experimental manipulations. It was predicted that the source memory parameters would be larger for highly discriminable sources than for poorly discriminable sources and that the source memory parameters for the two context dimensions would be functionally dissociable, indicating selective sensitivity for manipulations of source recollection on either dimension.
The second experiment investigated the mental representation and retrieval of multidimensional source information further. As discussed earlier, the multinomial memory model for crossed source information allows testing whether multidimensional source information is retrieved by independent recollection of individual attributes, by stochastically dependent access to indi-vidual attributes, or even in terms of an all-or-none principle. There is some evidence that features of multidimensional stimuli are stored and retrieved independently of each other (e.g., Galbraith, 1975 Galbraith, , 1976 Light & Berger, 1976; see Heathcote, Walker, & Hitch, 1994 , for a recent overview). Moreover, analyses of conjunction errors-that is, false conjunctions of previously presented features of multidimensional stimuli-showed that individual features are coded separately at the initial stage of visual perception (Treisman & Schmidt, 1982) and that they are accessed separately in recognition judgments and free recall (Reinitz, Lammers, & Cochran, 1992) .
Other prominent models of storage and retrieval, in contrast, result in dependent recollection of context attributes. The fragmentation hypothesis of Jones (1976 Jones ( , 1978 Jones ( , 1984 contends that memory traces consist of fragments of the encoding episode and that the retrieval of one feature of a fragment triggers retrieval of the whole fragment in an all-or-none manner. In a similar vein, the encoding specificity hypothesis (Tulving, 1983; Tulving & Thomson, 1973) suggests that mutual cuing among attributes in episodic memory results in stochastically dependent retrieval of information acquired during the encoding situation. Whereas both assumptions of stochastically independent and dependent retrieval gain some support from the literature, the possibility of an all-or-none principle of context memory has been largely refuted by recent studies in the process dissociation paradigm (Dodson & Johnson, 1996; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1996) .
It may be hypothesized that attention and the level of consciousness in the retrieval process moderate the degree of stochastic dependence among memories for individual context attributes. According to recent dual process theories of memory (e.g., Gardiner, 1988; Jacoby, Kelley, & McElree, 1999; Mandler, 1980; Tulving, 1985) , recognition judgments can be based on the conscious recollection of an item's occurrence in a previous episode or on a feeling of familiarity evoked by the item at test. It can be posited that recognition judgments based on conscious recollection are accompanied by the retrieval of an episodic context configuration containing several features of the encoding situation, whereas familiarity-based judgments do not involve retrieval of a context configuration (see Metcalfe, Mencl, & Cottrell, 1994 , for similar reasoning). As a consequence, source memory for different context dimensions is expected to be stochastically related in the case of conscious recollection but stochastically independent in the case of familiarity-based recognition. Preliminary corroboration for this hypothesis can be found in the detrimental effects of attentional load on the perception and recognition of feature conjunctions in multidimensional stimuli (Stefurak & Boynton, 1986; Treisman & Schmidt, 1982) , inasmuch as attentional load supposedly coincides with a reduction in effortful conscious processing. In our second experiment, we explored the hypothesis that the stochastic relation among memories for context attributes changes as a function of the recognition process by applying the multinomial memory model for crossed source information to different mental states of item recognition.
Experiment 1
The goal of the first experiment was to examine the empirical and psychological validity of the multinomial memory model for crossed source information across varying degrees of source recollection. For this purpose, we adapted an experimental procedure used by Yonelinas and Jacoby (1996) in which participants were presented with words that differed with respect to both location and font size. Deviating from the process dissociation methodology used by Yonelinas and Jacoby, however, a source memory test was administered in the present experiment. The source memory test required recognition of target words and source memory judgments on the two dimensions of location and font. Source recollection for the two dimensions was orthogonally manipulated by varying the similarity of the locations and fonts, respectively. Variations of source similarity have widely been used to manipulate source memory, with dissimilar source categories leading to better source discrimination performance than similar source categories (e.g., Ferguson et al., 1992; Johnson et al., 1995; Klauer & Wegener, 1998; .
Comparisons of the source recollection parameters for location and font across the four conditions of dissimilar locations and dissimilar fonts, dissimilar locations and similar fonts, similar locations and dissimilar fonts, and similar locations and similar fonts allow testing for the sensitivity and dissociability of the source recollection parameters in the memory model for crossed source dimensions. In particular, it was predicted that the parameters for either source dimension would be larger in the case of dissimilar sources than in the case of similar sources and that the two conditions with similar categories on one dimension and dissimilar categories on the other would exhibit a crossover dissociation between the source recollection parameters for location and font. The expected crossover dissociation would lend strong support to the psychological validity of the new multinomial measurement model.
Method
Participants. One hundred twenty students from Cardiff University participated in the experiment. First-year and second-year undergraduate students of psychology received partial course credit, and senior psychology students and students from other departments were paid £2. Each participant was quasi-randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions in the 2 ϫ 2 design of source similarity on the dimensions of location (dissimilar vs. similar) and font (dissimilar vs. similar). Thirty students were tested in each condition.
Materials. The instructions and all experimental materials were presented on the monitor of a Macintosh PowerPC. For each participant, 64 target items and 64 distractors were randomly drawn from a pool of 220 English nouns of four to seven letters. The nouns were taken from the word-norm study of Gilhooly and Logie (1980) and had mean concreteness scores of at least 6.00 on a 7-point rating scale. During the learning phase of the experiment, 32 target items were presented at an upper location on the screen, and 32 target items were presented at a lower location on the screen. In the case of dissimilar locations, the vertical axes of the words presented at the upper and the lower location were approximately 13.1 cm apart, with equal distance to the vertical center of the screen. In the case of similar locations, the distance between the vertical axes was reduced to approximately 2.5 cm. Irrespective of vertical position, all words were centered on the screen with respect to their horizontal axis.
At both locations, half of the items appeared in a larger font, and the other half appeared in a smaller font. In the conditions of dissimilar font sizes, the character heights were 0.7 cm and 1.8 cm, respectively. In the conditions of similar font sizes, the character heights were 1.0 cm and 1.5 cm. As a means of balancing the occurrence of the source combinations across the learning phase, the 64 target items were divided into four sequences of 16 items each. Within these sequences, location and font were determined randomly for each item with the constraint that 4 items appeared for each combination of location (upper vs. lower) and font size (small vs. large). The four sequences of 16 items were displayed one after the other without causing interruptions in the learning phase.
Procedure. The participants went through the procedure in individual sessions. In the instruction for the learning phase, participants were asked to memorize each word and its appearance for a later memory test. The instruction did not contain information about the varying locations and fonts of presentation, nor did the instruction provide any particulars about the memory test. This procedure was designed to ensure that the salience of the source dimensions depended solely on the physical similarity of the source categories. According to the 2 ϫ 2 between-subjects design of source similarity, the two locations were either far apart or close together, and the two font sizes were either very different or quite similar throughout the learning phase. The 64 target items were displayed one at a time for 4 s with an interstimulus interval of 1 s. After the learning phase, participants worked through an unrelated filler task for 3 min to erase the target items and their appearance from short-term memory.
In the subsequent test phase, participants worked through a source memory task for the crossed source dimensions of location and font. The 64 target items and 64 distractors were presented one at a time in random order and in a medium font size for all experimental conditions (character height: approximately 1.2 cm). For each of the 128 words, participants had to decide in a first step whether the word had been presented in the learning phase ("old" response) or not ("new" response). In the case of an "old" response, participants had to decide in a second step whether the word had appeared at the upper or the lower position, and in a third step they had to decide whether the word had been displayed in the smaller or the larger font. For each decision, the two response alternatives were presented side by side on the right of the test item. Responses were entered by mouse clicks on the appropriate response fields. The positions of the "old" and "new," "upper" and "lower," and "smaller" and "larger" response fields were randomized itemwise and independently for each step of the memory task to cancel out any position-based response tendencies.
Results
The response frequencies in the source memory task for location and font are displayed in Table 2 for the four experimental conditions of source similarity. The data were analyzed through the multinomial memory model for crossed source information. The order of the source dimensions in the model was specified according to the temporal order of source decisions in the memory task; that is, location was considered the first dimension and font the second dimension. Importantly, the outcome of the model selection procedure reported subsequently was not affected by reversing the order of dimensions in the model. The criterion of statistical significance was set to ␣ ϭ .05 for all goodness-of-fit tests and model comparisons, unless stated otherwise.
Initially, we examined whether the high threshold parameters of target item recognition were equal across the four source combinations within each experimental condition. As discussed earlier, this is accomplished by a test for stochastic independence of "old" versus "new" responses and source combination. The resulting likelihood ratio statistic has three degrees of freedom, and the corresponding critical value of statistical significance is G crit. 2 ϭ 7.81. The test rendered nonsignificant results for the three experimental conditions of dissimilar locations and dissimilar fonts, G 2 (3) ϭ 2.33; dissimilar locations and similar fonts, G 2 (3) ϭ 5.89; and similar locations and similar fonts, G 2 (3) ϭ 1.83. The hypothesis of equal high threshold parameters for target items could therefore be maintained, and the equality constraints D upper,small ϭ D upper,large ϭ D lower,small ϭ D lower,large ϭ D N were specified in all multinomial models for these conditions.
In contrast, the hypothesis of equal high threshold parameters of item recognition had to be rejected for the condition of similar locations and dissimilar fonts, G 2 (3) ϭ 10.92. As can be seen in Table 2 , the frequency of misses was particularly low for items that had been presented at the lower position and in the larger font relative to the other source combinations. If the frequencies of "old" and "new" responses to items presented at the lower position and in large font are fitted (e.g., by an appropriate contrast in a log-linear model; see Rindskopf, 1990) , the empirical fit of the independence model improves significantly, ⌬G 2 (1) ϭ 7.27 (G crit. The multinomial analyses were carried out with the MBT (Hu, 1993) and AppleTree (Rothkegel, 1998) programs. Table 3 (top  panel) shows the goodness-of-fit statistics for several identifiable submodels of the multinomial memory model for crossed source information in the four experimental conditions of source similarity. The submodels result from the restrictions displayed in Figure 3 . For reasons of model parsimony, we started with the most restrictive submodel, that is, the submodel containing Restrictions (1d) and (2d). The restrictions require that the guessing proportions of source assignments for recognized items equal those for unrecognized items and that the source recollection parameters are invariant across source combinations for both dimensions. These restrictions form the most parsimonious submodel in Figure 3 because they result in the fewest unconstrained model parameters. As can be seen in Table 3 , this submodel had to be rejected as a result of a significant misfit in three of the four experimental conditions. Similarly, the submodel with Restrictions (1c) and (2c), which impose equality constraints only on the guessing proportions, exhibited a significant misfit in three conditions. In contrast, the submodel with Restrictions (1b) and (2b), specifying invariant source recollection parameters within both source dimensions while leaving the guessing proportions unrestricted, yielded an excellent fit to the data for all conditions of the experiment. Moreover, dropping the equality constraints on the guessing proportions by moving from Restrictions (1d) and (2d) to Restrictions (1b) and (2b) resulted in a significant improvement in goodness of Post hoc power analyses using GPOWER (Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 1996; Faul & Erdfelder, 1992) showed that the goodnessof-fit tests were of sufficient statistical power to justify acceptance of the submodel with Restrictions (1b) and (2b). Because the tests were based on 3,840 (i.e., 30 ϫ 128) observations in each experimental condition, the power to detect model violations of even small effect size w ϭ .10 (Cohen, 1988) at the ␣ ϭ .05 level exceeded 99%. In light of the high test strength, the nonsignificant goodness-of-fit tests warrant acceptance of the multinomial memory model for crossed source information with Restrictions (1b) and (2b) as empirically valid. The high test strength might also suggest, however, that the goodness-of-fit tests were overly sensitive because of the large number of observations and that the submodels with Restrictions (1d) and (2d) and Restrictions (1c) and (2c) might have failed because of an inappropriately strict criterion for model rejection. Therefore, we also evaluated the goodness of fit of the various submodels according to the alternative criterion of equal statistical error probabilities for rejecting a valid model (i.e., ␣ error) and accepting an invalid model (i.e., ␤ error), which has been proposed as a reasonable testing strategy in the case of very large samples . We conducted the analyses using the "compromise" option of GPOWER for ␣ ϭ ␤ and small effect size w ϭ .10. The results confirmed the significant and nonsignificant outcomes obtained with the ␣ ϭ .05 criterion in every case. Thus, the submodel with Restrictions (1b) and (2b) proved superior according to both testing criteria and was selected for the further analyses.
Given empirical validity of the model, we sought to test the psychological validity of the model parameters. That is, we analyzed whether the parameters of source recollection follow experimental manipulations of source discriminability and whether the source memory parameters of the two context dimensions are dissociable in the conditions with one similar and one dissimilar source dimension. The parameter estimates in the selected submodel of the multinomial memory model for crossed source information are displayed in Table 4 , together with their 95% asymptotic confidence intervals. Conditional likelihood ratio tests were conducted to investigate the predictions concerning psychological validity. All tests were based on one degree of freedom and thus had a critical value of G crit. 2 ϭ 3.84 for statistical significance. First, general sensitivity of the source memory parameters to experimental manipulations was examined by comparing the condition of dissimilar source categories on both dimensions with the condition of similar source categories on both dimensions. Conforming to predictions, the source recollection parameters for location (d loc ) and font size (d font and e font ) were larger in the condition of dissimilar locations and dissimilar fonts than in the condition of similar locations and similar fonts, as can be seen in Table 4 . The difference was significant for d loc , ⌬G 2 ϭ 43.04, and e font , ⌬G 2 ϭ 5.31. The d font parameter was more than twice as large in the condition of dissimilar locations and dissimilar fonts as in the condition of similar locations and similar fonts, but the difference failed to attain significance because of the huge confidence interval of the parameter estimate in the latter condition, ⌬G 2 ϭ 1.46. 2 Taken together, the source memory parameters proved to be sensitive to the manipulation of source similarity, although one of the tests did not reach statistical significance for technical reasons of parameter estimation.
Second, the predicted crossover dissociation of the source recollection parameters for location and font was analyzed by com-1 We also tested the multinomial memory model for crossed source information with the alternative assumption of a one-high threshold process of item recognition rather than a two-high threshold process. Imposing identifiability Restrictions (1b) and (2b) on the source memory parameters and specifying D N ϭ 0 instead of D N ϭ D ij for distractor identification resulted in somewhat larger but still nonsignificant values of the likelihood ratio statistic: G 2 (9) ϭ 8.19 for dissimilar locations and dissimilar fonts, G 2 (9) ϭ 12.19, for dissimilar locations and similar fonts, G 2 (8) ϭ 10.21, for similar locations and dissimilar fonts, and G 2 (9) ϭ 4.13 for similar locations and similar fonts.
2 Because the parameter of font recollection d font is specified conditional on recollection of location, the low estimate of d loc in the condition of similar locations and similar fonts results in a large standard deviation for the estimate of d font . The same holds true for the condition of similar locations and dissimilar fonts. loc , was larger in the condition of dissimilar locations and similar fonts than in the condition of similar locations and dissimilar fonts, ⌬G 2 ϭ 31.61, whereas the opposite was found for the source recollection parameters for font size, ⌬G 2 ϭ 14.93 for d font and ⌬G 2 ϭ 4.40 for e font . The reversal of the source memory parameters for location and font size across the two experimental conditions constitutes a complete crossover dissociation, which indicates specific effects of source similarity on the memory parameters for either of the two source dimensions. Thus, the source memory parameters for the two dimensions proved to reflect experimental changes of source recollection and to be dissociable in the predicted way, thereby establishing psychological validity of the multinomial memory model for crossed source information.
The confirmation of empirical and psychological model validity allows the investigation of further assumptions regarding the representation and retrieval of multidimensional source information. For this purpose, additional parameter restrictions were imposed on the selected submodel that represent the assumptions of stochastic independence of source recollection and an all-or-none principle, respectively. Stochastic independence of source recollection on the two context dimensions was specified by the equality constraint d font ϭ e font . As displayed in Table 3 (bottom panel), the independence assumption resulted in a significant model rejection in the condition of similar locations and dissimilar fonts. Furthermore, model fit decreased significantly in the condition of dissimilar locations and dissimilar fonts, ⌬G 2 (1) ϭ 5.49, although the overall goodness-of-fit test did not indicate a significant misfit. Thus, in those conditions in which the two fonts were quite distinct, source memory for font size was stochastically related to source memory for location. This was not the case in the remaining conditions, possibly because of the poor source recollection of similar fonts causing a near floor effect. The alternative assumption of an all-or-none principle of source recollection is reflected by the parameter fixations d font ϭ 1 and e font ϭ 0. This assumption caused significant model rejections in all experimental conditions (see Table 3 , bottom panel) and thus had to be abandoned.
Discussion
The major objectives of the first experiment were to test the empirical validity and the psychological validity of the multinomial memory model for crossed source information. These objectives were pursued by an orthogonal manipulation of source similarity on the two source dimensions of location and font size. In all four experimental conditions, the identifiable submodel with Restrictions (1b) and (2b) held statistically, indicating empirical Note. D ϭ probability of recognizing target items as old and identifying distractor items as new; b ϭ probability of guessing that an item is old; d loc ϭ probability of recollecting the location of recognized target items; d font ϭ probability of recollecting the font of recognized target items given recollection of location; e font ϭ probability of recollecting the font of recognized target items given no recollection of location; a loc ϭ proportion of guessing "upper" for recognized target items; a ͉upper font and a ͉lower font ϭ proportion of guessing "smaller" for recognized target items given assignment to upper category and lower category, respectively; g loc ϭ proportion of guessing "upper" for unrecognized target items and unidentified distractors; g ͉upper font and g ͉lower font ϭ proportion of guessing "smaller" for unrecognized target items and unidentified distractors given assignment to upper category and lower category, respectively. a In this experimental condition, the parameter D lower,large was not set equal to D. The estimate of this parameter is D lower,large ϭ .63 (CI ϭ .57, .68).
b CI bounded at the limit of the parameter space.
validity of the new model. The source recollection parameters proved to be substantially affected by the manipulations of source similarity. Most important, the crossover dissociation between the experimental conditions with high source similarity on one dimension and high source dissimilarity on the other confirmed that the source recollection parameters were selectively sensitive to variations of source discriminability on either dimension. The effects of experimental manipulations on the source memory parameters and the evidence of their dissociability thus demonstrate the psychological validity of the model. In the foregoing analyses, we tested for the predicted differences in source memory parameters between experimental conditions of highly dissimilar versus similar source categories on the two dimensions of location and font size. We refrained from postulating and testing invariance of source memory parameters across those conditions in which physical dissimilarity or similarity was constant for one dimension because attention to one source dimension might be affected by the salience of the other dimension. For instance, the different fonts could possibly attract more attention in the case of similar locations than in the case of dissimilar locations, so a strict invariance hypothesis did not seem justified. Nonetheless, the parameter estimates and confidence intervals in Table 4 show that invariance of the parameters d loc , d font , and e font held empirically. That is, the confidence intervals of d loc overlapped for the two experimental conditions with dissimilar locations and for the two conditions with similar locations. Also, the confidence intervals of d font and e font overlapped for the two conditions with dissimilar fonts and for the two conditions with similar fonts, but the width of the intervals limited their interpretability in some cases (see Footnote 2). Thus, the source memory parameters for one dimension proved to be widely unaffected by variations of source discriminability on the other dimension, although postulating a strict invariance hypothesis was precluded.
Notwithstanding that the focus of Experiment 1 was on the model parameters measuring source recollection, some comments on the parameter estimates of item recognition and guessing seem in place as well. As can be seen in Table 4 , the two-high threshold parameter of item recognition and distractor identification, D, was somewhat larger in the condition of dissimilar locations and dissimilar fonts than in the remaining conditions. Because variations in item-specific context information were most pronounced in the condition with dissimilar source categories on both dimensions, the enhanced recognition accuracy is in line with previous findings indicating that an increase in the availability of item-specific information leads to improved recognition performance (Einstein & Hunt, 1980; Hunt & Einstein, 1981) .
With respect to the guessing proportions in source assignments, the experiment showed that equality restrictions on the guessing parameters for recognized and unrecognized items led to a significant deterioration in goodness of fit in three of four experimental conditions. These results support the view of differential guessing processes in source assignments for recognized and unrecognized stimuli Riefer et al., 1994) . In particular, the conditional guessing proportions for assignment of unrecognized items to the smaller font given a response of "upper" or "lower" on the location dimension, g ͉upper font and g ͉lower font , consistently tended to be larger than .50, which was not the case for the corresponding guessing proportions for recognized items, a ͉upper font and a ͉lower font (see Table 4 ). This pattern of guessing parameters can be interpreted as reflecting the role of metacognitive inference rules in the assignment of familiar yet unrecognized items (e.g., "If the word had been presented in large font, I would have remembered it"). The operation of similar inference strategies has been demonstrated in old-new recognition decisions (Förster & Strack, 1998; Strack & Bless, 1994) , and there is evidence that such strategies can also affect source discrimination judgments (Hoffman, 1997) .
Finally, analysis of additional assumptions regarding the representation and retrieval of multidimensional source information clearly ruled out an all-or-none principle of source recollection, in line with findings from a different research paradigm (Dodson & Johnson, 1996; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1996) . The case of stochastically dependent versus independent memory for various aspects of the encoding episode, however, is less clear cut. Source memory for font size appeared to be stochastically related to source memory for location to some degree, at least, if the two fonts were sufficiently discriminable. The stochastic relation between memory for crossed dimensions of context information therefore formed the focus of our second experiment, in which the moderating role of different states of recognition memory in the retrieval of multidimensional source information was investigated.
Experiment 2
Dual process models of recognition memory distinguish two bases for judging that an item was presented during an earlier learning phase: conscious recollection of the item's occurrence and a feeling of familiarity evoked by the item at test (e.g., Gardiner, 1988; Jacoby et al., 1999; Mandler, 1980; Tulving, 1985) . Conscious recollection involves controlled retrieval processes and is linked to the personal past in episodic memory ("autonoetic consciousness"; Tulving, 1985) , whereas familiarity-based recognition is driven by automatic processes and refers mainly to semantic, rather than episodic, memory ("noetic consciousness"; Tulving, 1985) .
A prominent approach to disentangling the relative contributions of conscious recollection and familiarity-based judgments in recognition memory is the "remember"-"know" paradigm (Gardiner, 1988; Tulving, 1985) , which makes use of participants' subjective experience at the time they recognize an item as "old." In this experimental paradigm, participants not only decide whether they recognize an item but also judge whether the recognition of an "old" item is based on conscious recollection ("remember" response) or not ("know" response).
The notion that the mental states underlying remember and know responses reflect separable components of memory has gained support from studies demonstrating selective effects of experimental manipulations on either remember or know responses, or even opposite effects on the two response rates. For instance, remember responses were selectively facilitated by deep levels of processing (Gardiner, 1988; Gardiner, Java, & Richardson-Klavehn, 1996) , item generation (Gardiner, 1988; Gardiner et al., 1996) , and enactment (Conway & Dewhurst, 1995; Engelkamp & Dehn, 1997) , whereas selective inhibition was shown by divided attention (Gardiner & Parkin, 1990 ) and length of retention interval (Gardiner & Java, 1991) . In contrast, a priming manipulation led to selective facilitation of know responses (Rajaram, 1993) . Functional dissociations, with opposite effects of experimental manipulations on remember and know responses, occurred for pictorial versus verbal presentation of target words (Dewhurst & Conway, 1994; Rajaram, 1993) , conditions fostering rote rehearsal versus elaborative rehearsal (Gardiner, Gawlik, & Richardson-Klavehn, 1994) , and exact repetition of target words versus category repetition (Dewhurst & Anderson, 1999) , for example. Although these findings do not strictly imply the operation of separate memory systems, as shown by Donaldson (1996) and Hirshman and Master (1997) , they do indicate that remember and know judgments reflect functionally distinct states of recognition memory.
By its operational definition, remembering involves recollection of episodic context information and, thus, source memory for some of the attributes of the encoding situation. This contention has been corroborated empirically by the use of event-related potentials, experimental manipulations during the learning phase, and assessment of source memory in the two mental states of remembering and knowing. First, Rugg et al. (1998) showed that the pattern of electrophysiological brain activity taking place during "remember" judgments is equivalent to that during successful source recollection in a source memory test. Second, several studies indicate that encoding manipulations that enhance source memory accuracy also increase the rate of remember responses, and vice versa (Conway & Dewhurst, 1995; Dewhurst & Hitch, 1999; Donaldson, MacKenzie, & Underhill, 1996) . Third, source assignments following remember judgments have been shown to be more accurate than those following know judgments (Dewhurst & Hitch, 1999) .
In Experiment 2, we built on the theoretical contention and empirical evidence that remember judgments entail source memory. In particular, we hypothesized that remembering involves not only source memory for individual attributes of the encoding episode but memory for configurations of those attributes. We posited that conscious recollection is accompanied by a revival of the unique event when the item was perceived in the past and that this process brings back to mind a configuration of co-occurring attributes that characterized the encoding episode. Therefore, memory for individual context features should be stochastically related in the mental state of remembering. In contrast, no such revival of the co-occurrence of episodic attributes is given for know responses, so residual source memory for individual context attributes should not be stochastically related in this mental state. Hence, remember judgments are expected not only to give rise to higher source memory accuracy than know judgments but to result in a stronger stochastic relation of memory for various source attributes (see Metcalfe et al., 1994 , for a similar hypothesis concerning explicit and implicit memory).
Testing the prediction that source memory for different context attributes is stochastically related in the case of conscious recollection and stochastically independent in the case of familiaritybased recognition judgments is a genuine application of the new multinomial memory model for crossed source information. As elaborated earlier, the model allows measuring source memory for different aspects of the encoding episode as well as testing assumptions regarding the stochastic interdependency between the source memory processes. In Experiment 2, we applied the multinomial model to the frequency data from an extended source memory task that assessed item recognition ("old" vs. "new"), the mental state of recognition memory ("remember" vs. "know"), and source memory decisions on the physical dimensions of location and font size. Unlike the first experiment, source similarity was not varied in Experiment 2, but all participants received the condition of dissimilar locations and dissimilar fonts.
Method
Participants. Forty-three students from various departments of Cardiff University participated in the experiment for course credit or money. None of the participants had taken part in the previous experiment.
Materials. The materials were identical to those of Experiment 1. During the learning phase, the 64 target items were presented at the two dissimilar locations and in the two dissimilar fonts.
Procedure. The procedure was identical to Experiment 1 except for the introduction of a "remember"-"know" judgment in the source memory task. At test, participants had to decide, for each of 64 target items and 64 distractors, whether the word had been presented in the learning phase or not. In the case of an "old" response, participants also had to decide whether they "remembered" the word or whether they "knew" that the word had been presented. Source memory decisions on the two dimensions of location (upper vs. lower) and font size (smaller vs. larger) followed the remember-know judgment. The instructions for the remember-know distinction closely followed those used by Gardiner (1988) and Rajaram (1993) . The two states of recognition memory were described to the participants as follows:
"Remember" means that your recognition of the word is accompanied by a conscious, maybe even vivid recollection of its prior occurrence in the learning phase. That is, to "remember" is the ability to become aware again, or to "relive," the earlier experience of the word. For example, if a certain association, idea, or feeling you had during the prior exposure comes to your mind again when you recognize the word, you are "remembering" it.
To "know" that a word occurred during the learning phase means that you recognize the word but you cannot actually "remember," or recollect, its earlier presentation. That is, your recognition is not accompanied by a conscious revival of the event when the word was presented to you earlier. In other words, you recognize the word from the learning phase, but it does not evoke a personal recollection of your previous experience of the word during the learning phase.
Results
The response frequencies in the source memory task with remember-know judgments for items considered "old" are displayed in Table 5 . The multinomial memory model for crossed source information had to be slightly modified to incorporate the remember-know distinction. First, five technical parameters were specified to fit the proportions of remember and know judgments for "old" items. That is, four parameters R ij denoted the probability of remember responses to recognized target items from source combination (i, j), and one parameter R * denoted the probability of remember responses to unrecognized target items and unidentified distractors considered old by guessing. Complementarily, 1 Ϫ R ij was the probability of know responses to recognized target items, and 1 Ϫ R * was the probability of know responses to unrecognized target items and unidentified distractors. The differentiation between R ij and 1 Ϫ R ij was introduced as an additional binary step following D ij in the processing tree representation of the multinomial model (Figure 2) . The differentiation between R * and 1 Ϫ R * was introduced following (1 Ϫ D ij )b for target items and following (1 Ϫ D N )b for distractors. By this specification, R * represents the probability of remember responses to unrecognized items irrespec-tive of their origin-that is, source combination (i, j) or a new distractor-which reflects the assumption that the proportion of remember responses is invariably low for unrecognized target items from any source combination and for unidentified distractors.
3 Together, the five R parameters ensured that the actual proportions of remember and know responses to items considered "old" were fitted for each row of Table 5 .
As a second modification of the multinomial model, the memory and guessing parameters referring to source assignments were specified conditional on the mental states of recognition memory. were estimated, one for remember judgments and the other for know judgments. Specification of the high threshold and guessing parameters of the old-new decision, D and b, was not affected by the modification of the model.
As in the previous experiment, we first examined whether the high threshold parameters of target item recognition were equal across the four source combinations. The corresponding test for stochastic independence of "old" versus "new" responses and source combinations showed that the hypothesis of equal high threshold parameters for target items could be maintained, G 2 (3) ϭ 6.04, (G crit. 2 ϭ 7.81). Therefore, the equality constraints D upper,small ϭ D upper,large ϭ D lower,small ϭ D lower,large ϭ D N were imposed in all multinomial models discussed subsequently.
The model that resulted from the preceding specifications and Restrictions (1d) and (2d) (see Figure 3) ϭ 25.00). Post hoc power analyses showed that the goodness-of-fit tests had sufficient statistical power to justify model acceptance in the case of nonsignificant results. Because the tests were based on 5,504 (i.e., 43 ϫ 128) observations, the power to detect model violations of small effect size w ϭ .10 with ␣ ϭ .05 exceeded 99%. To enhance comparability with the foregoing experiment, we chose the submodel with Restrictions (1b) and (2b) for further analysis.
The parameter estimate for the joint high threshold parameter of target item recognition and distractor identification was D ϭ .58 (confidence interval: .56, .60). The estimated guessing probability of an unrecognized item being old was b ϭ .27 (confidence interval: .25, .29). The estimates for the memory and guessing parameters referring to source assignments in the mental states of remembering and knowing are displayed in Table 6 . The following conditional likelihood ratio tests for differences between source memory parameters were based on one degree of freedom and had a critical value of G crit. 2 ϭ 3.84. In line with the expectation that source memory is better in the mental state of remembering than knowing, the d loc and d font parameters were more than twice as large for remember judgments as for know judgments (see Table  6 ). The difference was significant for d loc , ⌬G 2 ϭ 17.21, but did not attain significance for d font as a result of its huge confidence interval for know responses, ⌬G 2 ϭ 2.84. 4 In contrast, there was virtually no difference in e font between the two mental states, ⌬G 2 Ͻ 1, indicating that the enhancement of source memory in the state of remembering was limited to the conjoined recollection of location and font size. Despite the evidence for better source memory in the case of remembering, source memory accuracy was well above chance level in the state of knowing, as indicated by the nonzero source memory parameters.
Because our main hypothesis was that source memory for location and source memory for font would be stochastically related in the case of remember judgments but stochastically independent in 3 In particular, we presumed that the "remember" proportions for recognized target items exceeded the "remember" proportion for unrecognized target items and unidentified distractors. The estimated proportions of remember judgments in the selected submodel were R upper,small ϭ .73 (confidence interval: .67, .78), R upper,large ϭ .70 (confidence interval: .64, .75), R lower,small ϭ .76 (confidence interval: .70, .81), and R lower,large ϭ .73 (confidence interval: .68, .78) for recognized target items and R * ϭ .13 (confidence interval: .09, .17) for unrecognized target items and unidentified distractors. These estimates support the supposition that participants were more likely to make a remember judgment if they recognized an item as "old," with probability D ij , than if they considered an item "old" on the basis of a guessing process, with probability (1 Ϫ D ij )b or (1 Ϫ D N )b, respectively.
4 Because the parameter d font is specified conditional on recollection of location, the comparatively low estimate of d loc for know judgments as well as the low overall proportion of know judgments, as compared with remember judgments, resulted in a large standard deviation for the estimate of d font . ϭ 26.30). In contrast, model fit did not decrease when the independence assumption was specified for the state of knowing, ⌬G 2 Ͻ 1, and the overall model including this assumption still showed an excellent empirical fit, G 2 (16) ϭ 9.92. Hence, stochastic independence between source memory for location and source memory for font size could be maintained for know responses, whereas it was clearly rejected for remember responses.
Discussion
The second experiment investigated multidimensional source memory when item recognition was based on conscious recollection or on a feeling of familiarity. Following the remember-know paradigm, participants decided whether or not recognition of an item was accompanied by the experience of consciously recollecting its occurrence in the learning phase. The experimental design thus allowed us to replicate previous findings indicating that source memory is better given remember than know judgments (Dewhurst & Hitch, 1999) and to test the novel prediction that source memory for different aspects of the encoding episode is stochastically related in the state of remembering but independent in the state of knowing.
The analysis with the multinomial memory model for crossed source information yielded results that were consistent with our hypotheses. First, there was evidence that memory for the context dimensions of location and font size was more accurate when item recognition was accompanied by a "remember" than a "know" experience. Second, for remember judgments, the probability of recollecting font size was significantly larger if the location had been recollected than if the location had not been recollected, reflecting stochastic dependence. In contrast, there was no indication of stochastic dependence among source memories for location and font size for know judgments. Given the size and the near numerical equivalence of the d font and e font parameters for know judgments (see Table 6 ), it appears unlikely that the excellent fit of the independence assumption was merely due to a floor effect of source memory for font size.
5 Rather, the results corroborate our notion of a different representation of multidimensional source memory in the case of conscious recollection as opposed to familiarity-based "old" responses.
If recognition is accompanied by remembering a word's physical appearance during the learning phase, some configuration of co-occurring physical attributes comes back to mind that characterized the earlier presentation. Thus, recollection of location is likely to be combined with, or to cue, recollection of font size. Alternatively, if recognition is accompanied by remembering nonsensory episodic information from the learning phase, such as a personal word association or the fact that one had to cough during item presentation, both location and font have a low likelihood of being recollected. Taken together, a remember experience should result in stochastically related recollections of various contextual attributes. If recognition is based on a mere feeling of familiarity, however, no configuration of co-occurring attributes is accessible that made the encoding episode a unique event in the past. Therefore, residual memory for contextual attributes should be unrelated.
Experiment 2 confirmed our prediction that the stochastic relation of source memories for multiple episodic attributes differs as a function of the mental state of recognition memory. This observation has implications for theories of the representation and retrieval of multidimensional context information and for the foundations of the remember-know paradigm. First, previous research on the memory representation of multidimensional stimuli has produced inconsistent results with respect to the stochastic relation of feature retrieval. Independence has prevailed in some studies (e.g., Galbraith, 1975 Galbraith, , 1976 Heathcote et al., 1994; Light & 5 Ideally, the stochastic relation of source memories for individual context attributes should be compared between remember and know judgments with approximately equal source memory performance in both mental states. Otherwise, differences in the stochastic relation might arise simply because of the different overall levels of source memory rather than because of the particular memory representations presumed for the two mental states of item recognition. However, this methodological demand appears to be unrealistic in the given context because different levels of source memory accuracy for "remembered" and "known" items are implied by theoretical considerations as well as by previous empirical findings. Importantly, given that none of the source memory parameters in Table 6 approach zero or one, the obtained difference in the stochastic relation can be interpreted without the risk of artifacts due to floor or ceiling effects. Note. d loc ϭ probability of recollecting the location of recognized target items; d font ϭ probability of recollecting the font of recognized target items given recollection of location; e font ϭ probability of recollecting the font of recognized target items given no recollection of location; a loc ϭ proportion of guessing "upper" for recognized target items; a ͉upper font and a ͉lower font ϭ proportion of guessing "smaller" for recognized target items given assignment to upper category and lower category, respectively; g loc ϭ proportion of guessing "upper" for unrecognized target items and unidentified distractors; g ͉upper font and g ͉lower font ϭ proportion of guessing "smaller" for unrecognized target items and unidentified distractors given assignment to upper category and lower category, respectively. a CI bounded at the limit of the parameter space. Berger, 1976) , whereas the notion that individual features are stored and retrieved jointly has been supported in others (e.g., Jones, 1976 Jones, , 1978 Jones, , 1984 Tulving & Thomson, 1973) . The present findings reveal that the degree of conscious awareness in the process of item recognition functions as an important moderating variable for the stochastic relation of memories for a given pair of context dimensions, paralleling similar results in the realm of visual perception (Treisman & Schmidt, 1982) . Although not tested here, the kinds of context dimensions used in the memory test will supposedly have a substantial impact on the interdependency of source memory as well.
Second, the results of Experiment 2 are in line with the fundamental assumption that remember and know judgments reflect distinct states of recognition memory, with the former indicating the revival of a particular context configuration from the encoding situation and the latter lacking this link to the personal past. Admittedly, the simplifying view that observed remember and know responses mark nonoverlapping, "process-pure" mental states of recognition memory-a view that implicitly forms the basis of most applications of the remember-know paradigm, including the present one-appears to be an overly strict assumption that should be overcome by more elaborate modeling approaches in the future. Nevertheless, the present demonstration that source memory for different attributes is stochastically related in the state of remembering, but stochastically independent in the state of knowing, adds a new piece of evidence to the existing literature in support of the theoretical and empirical foundations of the remember-know distinction.
General Discussion
The starting point of our model presentation was the observation that memory for multiple dimensions of source information plays a key role in the current theory and application of source memory tests. The concept of multidimensional source memory forms a theoretical cornerstone in the general source memory framework (Johnson et al., 1993) , and memory for various aspects of source information constitutes the basis of experiments involving superimposed Ferguson et al., 1992; Geiselman & Crawley, 1983; Johnson et al., 1995; Rugg et al., 1998) or crossed (Chalfonte & Johnson, 1996; Johnson et al., 1982; Klauer & Meiser, 2000; Schacter et al., 1994; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1996) context dimensions. As outlined in the introduction, however, the investigation of source memory for superimposed context dimensions and the prevailing use of memory tests for individual attributes, even in studies with crossed context information, do not allow an in-depth analysis of the complexity of multidimensional source monitoring.
To analyze the representation and retrieval of multidimensional source information further, we proposed a multinomial model that provides estimates of source recollection for crossed dimensions of context information and allows one to test detailed assumptions on the relation of source memories for different attributes of the encoding episode. Sufficient conditions for model identifiability were specified, and model validity was examined in the first experiment. That experiment demonstrated that the model shows an excellent fit to empirical data and that the source recollection parameters for different context dimensions are sensitive to experimental manipulations and dissociable from each other. Thus, by indicating that the multinomial memory model for crossed source information meets the criteria for empirical and psychological validity, the results lend strong support to the veridicality of the model as a measurement tool for multidimensional source memory.
In the second experiment, we applied the model to test an original prediction concerning the representation and retrieval of multidimensional source information in episodic memory. Borrowing from findings in the domain of visual perception (Treisman & Schmidt, 1982) and from previous-as yet untested-ideas in the realm of explicit versus implicit memory (Metcalfe et al., 1994) , we hypothesized that the degree of conscious awareness in recognition memory moderates the stochastic relation of memories for various aspects of the encoding episode. In fact, the modelbased analysis revealed that memory for two context dimensions was stochastically related in the state of conscious recollection but stochastically independent in the state of familiarity-based recognition judgments. The results thus confirmed our prediction and provided a novel contribution to the literature on binding processes in memory. Thereby, the experiment also demonstrated that the new multinomial model meets still another criterion, that is, usefulness in experimental memory research.
Provided that the multinomial memory model for crossed source information proves to be empirically valid, psychologically valid, and useful for testing current research questions, two caveats have to be mentioned that should be kept in mind when applying the memory model for crossed source information or any other multinomial model. The first caveat concerns violations of statistical assumptions, and the second concerns the necessity of parameter restrictions.
First, parameter estimation and model testing rely on asymptotic statistical theory for large samples and on the assumption that observations are independent and identically distributed. These suppositions may rarely hold in experiments with finite samples in which few participants contribute many responses to the frequency table. On the contrary, the usual experimental procedure may lead to dependencies among responses and to individual differences between both participants and trials. Small samples and violations of the assumption of independent and identically distributed observations can cause biases in parameter estimates and goodnessof-fit tests (Riefer & Batchelder, 1991) , and thus they threaten the interpretation of multinomial models. Fortunately, robustness studies (Riefer & Batchelder, 1991) and comparisons of parameter estimates for selected subsamples have shown only small effects of moderate individual differences on the outcomes of model-based analyses. Moreover, alternative methods of model testing that do not rely on asymptotic theory, including resampling and simulation techniques such as parametric bootstrap, may help to avoid some of the problems in the future.
Although probable violations of statistical assumptions are by no means specific to the multinomial memory model presented herein, tests of stochastic independence of model parameters, which were crucial in both experiments, may be particularly susceptible to individual differences. For instance, the main hypothesis tested in Experiment 2 was that source memory for two context dimensions is stochastically dependent in the state of conscious recollection but not familiarity-based recognition, because source memory on one dimension cues source memory on the second dimension for each recollected item. Thus, the hypothesis implies stochastic dependence on a trial-by-trial basis and can be tested in terms of the dependence of source memory parameters if the assumption of independent and identically distributed observations holds. If the assumption is violated, however, stochastic dependence between source memory for two context dimensions might arise as a result of individual differences, with good source memory on both dimensions for some participants or trials and poor source memory for others, even if source memory is independent on a trial-by-trial basis.
6 Therefore, the effects of individual differences on tests for stochastic (in)dependence of model parameters should be addressed in future experimental research, for example by homogenizing samples with respect to baseline performance, and in Monte Carlo studies with varying performance parameters.
The second caveat concerns the necessity of parameter restrictions to achieve identifiability. In general, the parameters of a multinomial model can specify the probability of a latent process as depending on the outcome of other latent processes or as depending on components of the stimuli (see Batchelder & Crowther, 1997) . In the processing tree model of Figure 2, (i, j) , that is, across stimulus components. The equality constraints discussed for item memory D ij as well as the identifiability restrictions on source assignment parameters displayed in Figure 3 limit the extent to which latent processes may depend on other processes or on stimulus components. For example, Restrictions (1a), (1b), (2a), and (2b) require that (some of the) source memory parameters be invariant across (some of the) source combinations of target items, whereas Restrictions (1c) and (2c) reflect the assumption that source guessing is independent of item memory. From these considerations, it is clear that choosing a set of parameter restrictions to accomplish identifiability not only is a technical issue of model specification but requires conceptual decisions about the likelihood of dependencies among cognitive processes and about the impact of stimulus features on the processes involved. Therefore, general recommendations for the selection of appropriate restrictions seem precluded, and selection should be guided by the specifics of the stimulus design and research goals. For example, if the design induces some expectancy of differential memorizability of items from different sources, assuming independence of source guessing from item memory by imposing Restrictions (1c) and (2c) is likely to result in a misspecification (see Batchelder et al., 1994) . In contrast, this set of restrictions may be the most appropriate one if source memory, but not item memory, varies as a function of stimulus components.
Despite these two general caveats concerning possible violations of statistical assumptions and the necessity of imposing parameter restrictions, multinomial models have proved useful in various areas of experimental psychology (see Batchelder & Riefer, 1999 , for an overview). The multinomial memory model for crossed source information outlined and tested herein may add to the existing range of multinomial measurement tools for the investigation of substantial research questions.
